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COMMENTS
GOLDEN PARACHUTES: A PERK THAT
BOARDS SHOULD SCRUTINIZE
CAREFULLY
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1981 United States industry was dramatically trans-
formed by a record-breaking1 2,313 merger transactions with
a total value of seventy-three billion dollars.2 Tender offers 3
totaled 123, and seventeen percent of all cash tender offers
had a bidding premium4 exceeding one hundred percent. 5
The list of distinguished firms that forfeited their indepen-
dence led one English commentator to conclude "[f]easting
on corporate assets, or defending oneself against being eaten
by predators in turn, is seemingly a central preoccupation of
U.S. management."6
1. This is generally considered to be the fifth "peak" period of merger activity of
the century. The first period (1899-1903) consolidated producers within key indus-
tries and was categorized as "merging for monopoly." The second period (1926-1929)
has been called "merging for oligopoly." During the third period (1940-1949), many
smaller firms sold out for estate tax considerations. The fourth phase (1955-1968) has
been referred to as "merging for growth" and has resulted in the formation of con-
glomerates. See generally Five Merger Movements, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS,
Spring 1982, at 6.
2. Merger Review, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, Spring 1982, at 6.
3. Tender offers are public solicitations for shares of a "target" company, gener-
ally at a price above the current market value of the shareholder's stock. For a discus-
sion of the mechanics of a tender offer and responses to it, see E. ARANOW, H.
EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE
CONTROL (1977); A. FLEISCHER, TENDER OFFERS: DEFENSES, RESPONSES AND
PLANNING (1978).
4. A bidding premium occurs when shareholders receive a payment above the
market value of their stock. Thus, if stock in Company 4 were selling for $10 per
share and the tender offer were $20 per share, there would be a 100% bidding
premium.
5. Austin & Boucher, Tender Offer Update: 1982, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS,
Fall 1982, at 48. The authors propose that the rise in tender offer premiums may be
attributable to the fact that almost 50% of the tender offers that were contested failed
during 1981. Id. at 49.
6. Thackray, The American Takeover War, MGMT. TODAY, Sept. 1982, at 82.
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During 1982 and 1983 the pace slowed, but one epic con-
frontation occured in 1982 when William Agee, Chairman
of Bendix Corporation, announced a $1.5 billion takeover
bid for the Martin Marietta Corporation. Bendix success-
fully purchased a controlling interest in Martin Marietta,
which in turn, with the aid of United Technologies Corpora-
tion, sought to acquire Bendix. Describing the conse-
quences, Agee stated, "[t]o avoid a disastrous situation in
which each company in effect owned the other, Bendix
merged with the Allied Corporation."' 7 The fierce battle re-
warded shareholders of Bendix with eighty-five dollars a
share for stock that was trading at approximately fifty-two
dollars a share before the takeover attempt. In the process,
however, Allied incurred $1.6 billion in debt, which raised
its debt-to-capital ratio from twenty-two percent to forty-
four percent. Martin Marietta's price for freedom also left
the company "certainly less well off than [they] were 33 days
ago."9
When the action subsided, the takeover, and those who
orchestrated it, was harshly criticized.10 Hopefully, the epi-
7. Agee, Corporate Mergers' Value, N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1982, at A31, col. 3.
8. News Analysis: Russian Roulette, Executive Style, INDUSTRY WK., Oct. 18,
1982, at 19, 20. A significant rise in this ratio greatly restricts the ability of the firm to
borrow money in the future. A low ratio has historically been an indication of
financial stability.
9. Id. at 20-21. Mr. Pownall, Chairman of Martin Marietta, understated the
magnitude of the variance. Bendix's final offer was roughly equivalent to $55 per
share for Marietta's stock, which was selling for less than $30 during most of 1982.
The firm increased its long-term debt from $400 million to $1.3 billion and its debt-to-
capital ratio rose from 22% to 44%. The present annual interest payment of approxi-
mately $120 million is over one-half of 1981 earnings. Its book value has fallen from
$34 to $25 per share and Allied owns 39% of its stock. Moodys Investors Service
responded by downgrading its commercial-paper rating for the firm from P- 1 to non-
prime and its senior unsecured debt from Al to Baa3.
10. See, e.g., Drucker, Curbing Unfriendly Takeovers, Wall St. J., Jan. 5, 1983, at
20, col. 4 ("The question is no longer whether unfriendly takeovers will be curbed but
only when and how. The recent shoot-out between Bendix and Martin Marietta has
deeply disturbed even the staunchest laissez-faire advocates in the business commu-
nity."); Hayes, Bendix et al, A Perspectivefrom Harvard.- The Undermining of Business
Credibility, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1982, § 3 (Business), at 2, col. 3; Salmans, Whither
Mergers in the Wake ofBendix?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1982, § 3 (Business), at 9, col. 1.
Perhaps the most scathing criticism, supported by financial statistics, was that which
asked, DidAnyone Win the Bendix Game?, Bus. WK., Oct. 11, 1982, at 28, and con-
cluded, "what started as a Keystone comedy will be revealed for the 'corporate trag-
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sode will have beneficial results. I I It appeared to be a "win-
win" situation 2 for those involved in the Bendix-Marietta
battle. In particular, the executives of both companies were
protected. This comment will discuss and analyze "golden
parachute" contracts that shielded these executives from
financial hardship. 13 It will consider the purpose of golden
parachutes, analyze their impact and critique their results.
II. PREVALENCE AND CHARACTERISTICS
OF GOLDEN PARACHUTES
Golden parachutes14 are either modifications of existing
employment contracts or separate employment agreements
that provide for special payments, or a continuation of sal-
ary and benefits, to executives when their company is subject
to a change of control.'5 Under traditional employment con-
tracts, many executives were guaranteed a specified level of
remuneration for their services both during and after em-
edy' that close assessors say it is." Id. at 29; Rock, Letterfrom the Publisher, Beyond
Bendix: A Code of M & .4 Conduct, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, Fall 1982, at 4.
11. Partially as a result of the Bendix affair the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion established an Advisory Committee on Tender Offers which has issued its report.
SEC Advisory Committee on Tender Offers, Report of Recommendations, (July 8,
1983), reprinted in FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) Special Report No. 1028 (July 15, 1983)
[hereinafter cited as SEC Advisory Report].
12. In game theory a win-win situation exists when all the parties can benefit
from the result. This is in contrast to situations in which any advantage to one party
causes a corresponding loss to the other participant.
13. See also Klein, Controversial Perk- A Golden Parachute Protects Executives,
But Does it Hinder or Foster Takeovers?, Wall St. J., Dec. 8, 1982, at 56, col. 1 ("Top
executives of all four combatants in this year's fiercest takeover struggle- involving
Bendix Corp., Martin Marietta Corp., Allied Corp. and United Technologies-all
were wrapped in parachutes .. "). Law review articles and comments have begun
to study the agreements. See, e.g., Johnson, Anti-Takeover Actions and Defenses."
Business Judgment or Breach of Duty?, 28 VILL. L. REV. 51, 69-71 (1982); Profusek,
Executive Employment Contracts in the Takeover Context, 6 CORP. L. REV. 99 (1983);
Riger, On Golden Parachutes-Rpcords or Ripoffs? Some Comments on Special Termi-
nation Agreements, 3 PACE L. REV. 15 (1982); Comment, Future Executive Bailouts."
Will Golden Parachutes Fill the American Business Skies?, 14 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 615
(1983).
14. The term is borrowed from fairy tales and video games. It joins other innocu-
ous terms such as sleeping beauty, white knight, prince charming, pac-man, shark
repellant and poison pill.
15. The circumstances which trigger these agreements are critical and there are
significant differences between contracts. See infra text accompanying notes 26-30.
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ployment. However, there are major differences between
golden parachutes and traditional employment contracts.'
6
A. Follow the Leader
Ward Howell International, an executive recruiting firm,
has undertaken the definitive research into the use of golden
parachutes. 17 After examining the proxy statements of 665
companies from the Fortune 500 and Second 500 lists, the
study found that fifteen percent of the companies offered
parachute provisions to top managers.' 8 One executive con-
sultant stated "that at least twenty-five to thirty percent of
the major corporations have such agreements with one or
more of their top executives."' 19 But golden parachutes are
not used at some larger companies because the companies'
chief executives "are shy of receiving the sort of publicity
that attended the rapid adoption of such plans during the
Conoco and Bendix mergers. 2 °
The agreements are offered typically to senior executives
and key technical people.21 The definition of "key" varies
16. R. Lambert & D. Larcker, "Golden Parachutes," Executive Decision-Making
and Shareholder Wealth (1983) (unpublished manuscript) (available from authors at
J.L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University).
First, unlike most employment contracts, golden parachutes specify the remunera-
tion which is paid to the manager after a change of control; second, unlike traditional
employment contracts the manager can voluntarily leave the firm and obtain the
agreed upon remuneration; third, golden parachutes are frequently given to execu-
tives who do not have existing employment agreements; fourth, employment contracts
typically provide only a guaranteed salary, whereas golden parachutes commonly
provide other executive benefits. Id. at 4-5.
17. Other consultants also have recognized a growing interest in parachutes
among their clients. See, e.g., Cooper, Mergers and Acquisitions, INSTITUTIONAL IN-
VESTOR, Aug. 1982, at 65 (quoting Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. principal Peter
Chingos). Chingos also stated that of the ten largest takeovers in 1981, six of the
acquired companies had golden parachute arrangements. Id. at 66.
Joseph Flom, merger and acquisition specialist with Skadden, Arps, Slate, Mea-
gher & Flom, claimed that golden parachutes "are so common that a management
that refuses them might very well risk losing the services of a number of key employ-
ees." Morrison, Those Executive Bailout Deals, FORTUNE, Dec. 13, 1982, at 82, 83.
18. See WARD HOWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC., SURVEY OF EMPLOYMENT CON-
TRACTS AND "GOLDEN PARACHUTES" AMONG THE FORTUNE 1000 (1982) (available
from Ward Howell International, Inc., New York, New York).
19. See Meyer, Executive Compensation Must Promote Long-Term Commitment,
PERSONNEL AD., May 1983, at 37, 40.
20. Golden Parachutes in an Age of Fear, CHEMICAL WK., Dec. 1, 1982, at 10.
21. Technical experts will frequently be protected in firms in which their exper-
tise is the company's most valuable asset.
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widely.22 For instance, Professors Larcher and Lambert of
The Kellogg Graduate School of Management at North-
western University found that of those firms offering
parachutes, an average of 9.7% of the executives were cov-
ered.23  Furthermore, if the officers and directors are in-
cluded, 26.1% are protected.24 Therefore, a significant
percentage of the senior-level managers who determine the
firm's response to a potential takeover are covered by golden
parachutes.
B. Signficant Terms
The terms of the golden parachute packages also vary,
but the principle benefit - continuation of salary - is
found in virtually all of them. Salaries are paid for periods
of time ranging from twelve months to ten or more years.
However, many payments expire at the end of the principal
employment contract or when the executive is expected to
retire.
Many of the parachutes open when the executive can es-
tablish that both a "change of control" and "termination"
have occurred.26 A significant number of contracts do not
specifically define change in control. This may require judi-
22. See Cooper, supra note 17, at 66-67, which provides information on the
number of executives covered and answers the query, "How golden is your para-
chute?" The author presents data concerning: American Brands, American Can Co.,
AMF, Celanese Corp., Colt Industries, Conoco, Control Data Corp., Diamond Sham-
rock Corp., Kaiser Cement Corp., Kimberly-Clark Corp., Manville Corp., Phillips
Petroleum Co., Superior Oil and United Technologies Corp.
23. R. Lambert & D. Larcker, supra note 16. This insightful study examined the
changes in executive decision making and shareholder wealth associated with the
adoption of golden parachutes. Using a preliminary sample of firms adopting golden
parachutes, developed from discussions in published articles and surveys by several
executive compensation and executive recruiting firms, a final sample of 90 firms was
selected for empirical analysis. The study concluded that golden parachute disclosure
is associated with a statistically significant positive price reaction and that golden
parachutes used as antitakeover devices produced an adverse impact on shareholder
wealth and provided "insurance" to the manager resulting in a favorable impact on
shareholder wealth.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Since both events must occur before the executive may be compensated, it is
referred to as a "double trigger." Other agreements require only a change of control
and are referred to as "single trigger agreements." See generally McMillan & Rei-
singer, Takeover Protection for Executives: The "Golden Parachute," COMPENSATION
REV., First Quarter 1983, at 34.
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cial construction of the particular clause.27 A trigger defini-
tion or event is often provided, such as delisting on a stock
exchange, a specific percentage change in company owner-
ship (twenty percent ownership has frequently been used)28
or a change in the composition of the majority of the board
of directors.2 9
In addition, the termination clause is usually drafted
broadly to allow the employee to resign for certain reasons.
The employee may resign, for example, if the company at-
tempts to fire him; changes the employee's responsibility,
status, title or other "issues of pride"; or forces relocation.
Some allow the executive to leave if, in good faith, he does
not believe he can effectively carry out his responsibility.30
Many of the plans eliminate the termination trigger totally
and allow the executive to collect his compensation if he de-
cides to leave for any reason. The major exceptions found in
the termination clause are the employee's dismissal for cause
because of fraud or embezzlement, or the employee's
death.3'
The compensation and benefits clause will frequently
continue the executive's benefits, such as health insurance,
life insurance32 and pension contributions, as well as pay
"any legal fees that may be incurred by an executive in exer-
27. "Change of control" is generally defined in common law as the point at which
existing management no longer has full control over the destiny of the company or
their own jobs.
28. Executives of UNC Resources, formerly United Nuclear Corp., have
parachutes that can operate when anyone acquires as little as 15% of the company.
Morrison, supra note 17, at 85.
29. A particularly controversial parachute required the Mohasco Corp. to pay a
total of $829,222 to four executives who left the company when Gulf & Western in-
creased its holdings of Mohasco's stock to 22.5% exceeding the 20% control trigger.
Mohasco explained that the executives "weren't terminated," and their leaving "was
voluntary on their part." Each received cash equal to two years base salary plus an
amount equal to the incentive compensation the officer received for the two years
before a change in control. Mohasco Must Pay a Total of $829,222 to Four Ex-Of-
ficers, Wall St. J., Apr. 27, 1982, at 6, col. 3.
30. Morrison, supra note 17, at 85.
31. Profusek, supra note 13, at 107. Contracts that do not contain these excep-
tions would be subject to criticism for wasting corporate assets.
32. Thackray, The Battle of Brunswick, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, June 1982, at
73, points out that Brunswick's board was not going to take any chances. "For good
measure, they also paid up all future company and executive portions of manage-
ment's life insurance packages ...." Id. at 74.
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cising his severance option, which may include combatting
being fired. ' 33 Many firms also provide for immediate vest-ing of contingent compensation, such as restricted stock and
deferred contingent compensation.34  Acceleration of exer-
cise dates under stock option programs so that all stock op-
tions are exercisable immediately is extremely valuable due
to the frequent increase in stock price during the tender of-
fer. The ultimate benefit is the executive's option to receive
the pay-out and then continue in his present job and receive
his regular salary. 5
III. ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING GOLDEN PARACHUTES
A. Security and Competition for Talent
The most persuasive argument supporting the use of
golden parachutes is that they provide the executive with se-
curity in the event of a change of control. Executive
recruiters often approach executives who are content with
their present jobs. These executives will seek guarantees
before accepting a new position, particularly if the firm or
the industry is involved in merger speculation. 6 Reversing
the situation, the agreements provide the necessary security
so that the executive will remain with a company during a
33. Cooper, supra note 17, at 68;. Guardis SetAgainst Mergers, CHEMICAL WK.,
Apr. 7, 1982, at 15.
34. McMillan & Reisinger, supra note 26, at 40.
35. Morrison, supra note 17, at 87 (describing the situation which is currently in
litigation where the CEO of Burnup & Sims exercised a four million dollar parachute
and has since returned as CEO). See also Golden Rip-Offs, INDUSTRY WK., July 25,
1983, at 46, 47; Klein, supra note 13, at 56.
36. William Smith of Pabst Brewing Company is an excellent example. He was
president of Pittsburgh Brewery and, when he was approached by executive
recruiters, Pabst was already deeply involved in takeover speculation and litigation
with dissident stockholder Irwin Jacobs. It would be logical for an executive to seek
assurances in this type of situation. See generally Reed, Jacobs Hints Proxy Fight:
Shake-'em-up Boss to Pabst, ADVERTISING AGE, Sept. 21, 1981, at 2, col. 2. See also
World Business, ECONOMIST, Apr. 16, 1983, at 78, 81 ("Mr. Sculley [new president of
Apple Computer who resigned as president of Pepsi-Cola] says he looked before he
leaped, though he would get a $1 million 'golden parachute' if he had to leave his new
firm.").
An executive who is content in his present employment will only consider new
employment if the compensation is increased. The former compensation package is
thus the base which the new employer must start from to entice the executive to
change jobs.
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period of takeover rumors.37 It has been argued that the
agreements are a risk allocation method for which the execu-
tive would otherwise have to be financially compensated in
salary or other inducements, and therefore, they should be
considered as part of the total compensation package pro-
vided to the executive. 38 To properly assess this rationale,
top management's importance to a firm must be considered.
Executives' desire for security should be analyzed in light of
current levels of compensation for executives. 39
The importance of a chief executive officer (CEO) cannot
be overemphasized. Most directors would agree that nomi-
nating and electing the CEO is a board of directors' most
important function.4 0 The constraints caused by mostly un-
controllable economic, social, legal, technological and polit-
ical forces have made the task of managing a company more
difficult than it was a decade ago.4 1 For instance, proponents
of the efficient market theory of stock prices will embrace the
bittersweet sequel to the firing of Roy Ash as chief executive
officer of AM International. "It was a humiliating exit...
the stock market compounded the insult, as news of his de-
parture led to a $4-per-share jump in AM International
stock - boosting the value of his 300,000 shares by $1.2 mil-
lion." 42 This example shows how important financial ex-
37. Metz, Foiling Suitors to Forestall Takeovers, Many Concerns Move to Shore
Up Defenses, Wall St. J., Mar. 18, 1983, at 1, col. 6. See also Cabrera, Takeovers...
The risks of the game and how to get around them, MGMT. REV., Nov./Dec. 1982, at
44.
38. Arguably, it is relatively cheap insurance. Since the executive wants to be
compensated for the risk of job loss and resulting decline in future income, he would
either want the security provided by the parachute or a higher level of present com-
pensation. Since statistically the chances of a takeover are small, it is most likely
cheaper for the firm to assume this risk. If, however, a firm wanted coverage, the
event would be insurable by an insurance company.
It is also important to realize that the acquiring corporation may actually pay the
executive's compensation. Under this reasoning the payout is a fixed liability that the
acquiring firm assumes and includes as a transaction cost of the takeover. To the
extent that the acquiring firm believes the net worth and expected value of the target
corporation exceed its liabilities, it will proceed with the acquisition.
39. For an excellent treatment of top executive compensation see Vagts, Chal-
lenges to Executive Compensation: For the Markets or the Courts?, 8 J. CORP. L. 231
(1983) (considering the influences of the takeover mentality).
40. Every corporate charter bestows upon the board the duty to appoint the CEO.
See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 180.41 (1981-82).
41. Mueller, Foreward to S. VANCE, CORPORATE LEADERSHIP xii (1983).
42. Nazem, How Roy.Ash Got Burned, FORTUNE, Apr. 6, 1981, at 71.
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perts view the leadership of a corporation, and how quickly
the market responds to a change in top management.
The firing of a top executive is no longer the exception.
Furthermore, numerous CEO's have left for "personal rea-
sons" long before they wanted to retire. For example, two
presidents resigned from Falstaff Brewery within nine
months - the second resignation came less than two months
after the president's installation; National Tea had three
presidents in eight months; Kaiser Steel had eight presidents
in seven years.43 William Miller left the presidency of Can-
teen Corporation to become the president of Avis; however,
he was soon replaced at his new job when Avis named its
fifth president within three years.44 Finally, the firing of Lee
Iacocca as president of Ford Motor Company in a year in
which the corporation made $1.8 billion4 5 is evidence of the
tenure that CEO's possess today.46
Explanations for the causes of the latest merger wave are
numerous. Among them is the fact that inflation has altered
the buy-versus-build equation in the quest for growth.47 The
consequences of inflation are also varied. Generally, be-
cause of inflation, static firms must reallocate assets to fast-
growing businesses.48 Consequently, depressed stock prices,
which have pushed numerous firms significantly below book
value, create tempting opportunities for raiders, speculators
43. S. VANCE, CORPORATE LEADERSHIP 43 (1983).
44. Avis Names Viuoria As President, Firm's Fifth in Three Years, Wall St. J., Feb.
22, 1983, at 37, col. I.
45. Marion, CEO ofthe Year Award - Lee Iacocca of Chrysler, FIN. WORLD,
Mar. 31, 1983, at 22, 26.
46. Some management experts believe that the CEO should be a specialist in the
functional area which the external environment dictates. This theory dismisses the
view of the CEO as a generalist and categorizes him in a functional area based on
education and past experience. Conceivably a board would therefore fire a "market-
ing" or "planning" CEO when difficult financial conditions in the economy dictate a
"finance" or "numbers person."
47. Metz, Mergers Expected to Stay Plentiful in 1983 But Will Be Less Exciting,
Wall St. J., Jan. 3, 1983, at 5, col. 1.
48. News Analysis, supra note 8, at 20. Sears is a prime example of a firm that is
currently being rewarded by the market for forsaking retailing, with its cyclical
swings and low margins, and vigorously positioning itself as a financial services cor-
poration. The acquisitions of Allstate, Coldwell, Banker & Co. and Dean Witter all
move them closer to their goal of becoming "the leading purveyor of consumer
financial services." The New Sears, Unable to Grow in Retailing, It Turns to Financial
Services, Bus. WK., Nov. 16, 1981, at 140.
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or sharp CEO's intent on earning the maximum return for
their shareholders.49  Hired guns themselves contribute to
the momentum.5 0 Finally, the laissez-faire posture of the
Reagan administration with regard to mergers provides what
may be a brief opportunity for consolidation of companies."
While the cause of the recent increase in mergers is not cer-
tain, the result is predictable to the executive of an acquired
company: an acquirer provides top management for the ac-
quired company. Businessmen nervously tell the joke that
an employee of a company involved in an acquisition gets
the "mushroom treatment": first he is kept in the dark, then
he is stewed for awhile and finally he is canned. One period-
ical warns executives: "At the outset, dispel the comforting
illusion that only a few people are really frozen out in merg-
ers."'52 A study by Lamalie Associates found top executives
49. Ironically, less than ninety days before the Bendix offer one author stated:
The corporate world, no less than the fashion world, is a place of trends
and fads. William Agee, chairman of Bendix, mused publicly the other day
about the joys of buying minority interests in other companies. You can get
the 20%-size chunks at "wholesale," or market, prices and get out of your in-
vestment more easily than in full acquisitions. So, why go for a full acquisition
where you may have to pay anywhere from 35% to I00%, or more, over market
to clinch the deal?
Meyer, Lawyer's Lament, Arbitrager's Delight, FORBES, May 24, 1982, at 31. This
"portfolio manager" strategy is based on the premise that a dollar invested in the
other firm will bring the investing firm better returns than it could earn by investing
in its own business.
50. "Hired guns" are keenly interested in takeover battles. Since they are com-
pensated so substantially there is reason to "suggest" possible targets to a firm they
know is capable of making an acquisition. The Bendix-Marietta war generated an
estimated $40 million in fees for lawyers, investment bankers, public relations firms
and solicitation firms. See Money Well Spent: To Bankers and Lawyers It Was, IN-
DUSTRY WK., Oct. 18, 1982, at 20-21. See also Metz, supra note 37, at I, col. 1; Edito-
rials, The GildedRipoff, Bus. WK., Oct. 4, 1982, at 136.
51. See Blumstein, Baxter Rejects Call to Curb Mergers, N.Y. Times, June 3,
1983, § D (Business) at I, col. 3, in which the author states:
The takeovers, regardless of whether they are desired by the top executives of
the companies being acquired, are a "very socially beneficial mechanism," said
William F. Baxter, an Assistant Attorney General. His antitrust division inves-
tigates proposed mergers and other corporate activities to determine whether
they might reduce competition in violation of antitrust laws.
Takeovers are part of "a mechanism that enables corporate assets to be
shifted from lower- to higher-value uses" and are "one of the most important
functions that our capital markets perform," Mr. Baxter said.
52. Holding On In a Takeover, Bus. WK., Sept. 27, 1982, at 118. The article
reports that a "new survey by 'outplacement' consultants Drake, Bean & Morin Inc.
shows that of 1300 executives - with incomes of between $30,000 and $125,000 -
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to be in the greatest peril. After studying 260 senior execu-
tives involved in recent major takeovers, fifty-two percent of
the acquired executives had departed within three years.5 3
However, these statistics are misleading since in the acquisi-
tion of people-intensive, high technology companies, the ma-
jor asset may be the entrepreneur or brilliant chemist who,
with the aid of a golden parachute, is free to voluntarily ter-
minate his employment, often to the detriment of the new
owner.-4 That scenario occurred when the executives of Thi-
okol Corporation "defected" after Morton-Norwich ac-
quired the firm. President Robert Davis pulled the ripcord
on his four million dollar golden parachute because appar-
ently "it stuck his craw not to be CEO" and he hoped for an
"equal partnership" but did not get it.55 Other executives
with parachutes followed Davis out because they were near-
ing retirement, simply didn't want to move to Chicago, and
felt uncomfortable working for Morton. "These departures
don't bode well in a business (defense contracting) where
personal contacts count and where Morton has none. "56
Financial incentives offered to top management are note-
worthy to the media, and for almost thirty years, magazines
have published scorecards disclosing "who gets paid
what. ' 57 Boards of directors58 have also demanded informa-
who were 'severed' in the 18 months ending August 31, a disquieting 32% were let go
during mergers, takeovers, and the like." Id See also Nossiter, Oh, Those Golden
Parachutes They're a Great Comfort to More and More Executives, BARRONS, Nov.
29, 1982, at 15, col. 1 ("And history has shown that there are few species more endan-
gered than top management who fought the good battle and lost.").
53. Coff, Merger Mania Adds to Executives Woes, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1982,
§ 12, at 10.
54. Moon, Tender Offers: How to Win, FIN. EXECUTIvE, Aug. 1983, at 30. See
also B. Fox & E. Fox, CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS AND MERGERS, § 27.07 [1] (1982)
("If the skills, knowledge and experience of top management or key officials are im-
portant to the successful operations of the target company, and if those persons are
planning or likely to resign in the event of a takeover, these facts might be made clear
to any offering company.").
55. Dorfman, The Thiokol Defections, FORBES, Mar. 28, 1983, at 110.
56. Id. The question of whether key, creative people stay when "protected" was
also answered negatively when white knight United Technologies acquired Mostek
Corporation. "After the Acquisition by UT, one by one, five of the six people in
Mostek top management left." Lipton, High Technology Acquisitions, MERGERS &
ACQUISITIONs, Fall 1982, at 34, 38.
57. Business Week has been providing this information since at least 1950. See,
e.g., Top Drawer Pay, Bus. WK., May 20, 1950, at 35. It has been joined by numerous
other publications including Duns Review, Forbes and U.S. News & World Report.
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tion on compensation levels 59 for comparison purposes. In
fact, commentators have noted the seriousness which char-
acterizes the approach of boards to this important decision.6 °
Publicly-held firms must provide information to the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and also must dis-
close on proxy statements data concerning remuneration
paid to the firm's five highest paid officers.6' Publication of
this information provokes the perennial criticism that boards
Patton, Why So Many Chief Executives Make Too Much, Bus. WK., Oct. 17, 1983, at
24, argued:
Publication of the original executive pay survey in 1951 undermined the strong
company loyalty that had existed prior to the war.
Intense self interest began to dominate the actions of more and more exec-
utives. With compensation surveys to tell them what their job might be worth
and headhunters offering premiums of 50% or more, it became more attractive
- and lucrative - for executives to change jobs ....
58. The board of directors is charged by its charter and bylaws with the duty of
setting the compensation of the top executives. Boards may relegate this task to a
compensation committee. WIs. STAT. § 180.31 (1981-82).
59. Within the last twenty years numerous firms have been established to satisfy
the information requests of boards. These specialists analyze the total compensation
package and provide information concerning compensation paid to executives in
comparable positions. Major firms gathering this information include Hay Group
Associates; Towers, Perrin, Forster and Crosby; and McKinsey & Co.
60. See, e.g., Loomis, The Madness of Executive Compensation, FORTUNE, July
12, 1982, at 42.
Compensation committees spend enormous amounts of time checking what
peer companies pay, so that the committees can satisfy themselves they are not
getting grossly out of line. "Directors," says consultant Peter T. Chingos of
Peat Marwick Mitchell, "are almost paranoid on this subject. They know
there have been a few suits that have attacked the directors for paying too
much" - some have befallen Norton Simon and International Harvester -
"and they know the press likes to write about who's getting the most money.
No director wants to be the one paying the most."
Id. at 45. See also Meyer, supra note 19, at 38, in which the author states:
Skepticism of both executive performance and executive pay is growing in
the boardroom, where compensation committees have emerged as real power
centers in corporate governance. This derives from their role in setting goals
and in assessing corporate and executive performance. Executive compensa-
tion has emerged in the 1980's as a major tool of the board in directing and
controlling corporate activity.
61. Currently, disclosure of the remuneration of the five most highly compen-
sated executive officers must be provided if it exceeds $60,000. The SEC has recently
amended Item 402 of Regulation S-K [17 C.F.R §§ 229.402 & 240.14a-101], 48 Fed.
Reg. 44,473 (1983). The rules reduce the amount of information that companies must
disclose. See Hudson, SEC Proposes Reducing Data That Firms Must Report on Exec-
utives' Compensation, Wall St. J., Jan. 14, 1983, at 5, col. 2. The new rules have
already invoked criticism. See Concealing the Boss's Pay, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1983,
§ A, at 16, col. 1.
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are lax in discharging their responsibilities to their
shareholders.62
The success of most businesses depends in large part on
their ability to attract and keep good executives. 63 Competi-
tion among corporations for the best people is keen and sets
the level of executive compensation. 64 One study profiled
62. In perhaps the most significant article on the subject, one author stated:
In the upper reaches of corporate America, the market frequently does not
seem to work. In a totally rational world, top executives would get paid hand-
somely for first-class performance and would lose out when they flopped. But
to an extraordinary extent, those who flop still get paid handsomely.
... . [Slo many examples of near-unarguable excess exist that a lot of
directors must be thought guilty of falling down on the job, perhaps in part
because they are often themselves corporate executives and therefore benefi-
ciaries of the system.
... [Ilt is widely believed that many compensation committees are rub-
ber stamps, unwilling to be hard-nosed about the pay of top executives, partic-
ularly those chaps who are fellow members of the board.
Loomis, supra note 60, at 42-45. See also Is any CEO Worth $1 Million a Year?,
DIRECTORS & BOARDS, Winter 1982, at 26.
Nossiter, supra note 52, at 15, quotes Everett Keech, vice dean of the Wharton
School, for the proposition that the "proliferation of the pacts [golden parachutes]
raises the question - perhaps rhetorically - of how independent supposedly in-
dependent directors really are?"
63. See Meyer, supra note 19, at 37, in which the author stated:
Recent studies that matched companies in the same industries facing the same
stresses, the same business conditions and the same challenges, found that the
quality of management and its decisions spelled the difference between success
and failure.
... . [A]t the heart of corporate performance and productivity in
America, then, is the retention and the consistent motivation of high-quality
management.
See also Freedman v. Barrow, 427 F. Supp. 1129 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), which involved a
shareholder challenge to Exxon's incentive program. The court was cognizant of the
needs of corporations to retain and reward executives. "Keeping the high level of
motivation of these employees, retaining their loyalty in the future, and protecting
their skills, experience and specialized knowledge from raids by competitors or others
is the biggest single responsibility of top management, which naturally is also inter-
ested in its own compensation." Id. at 1136.
64. Petitpas, Good Pay Plans Can Support Strategy, INDUSTRY WK., Jan. 24,
1983, at 13. The author, director of Cresap, McCormick and Paget, Inc., stated that
"executive compensation is essentially determined by the market - that is, by what
others are paying to people who are working at given levels of responsibility and
performance." A strong argument can be made that the market for executive talent
has few significant entry barriers and there is a substantial pool of talent to draw
from. The relatively high level of turnover would support the competitive nature of
this market. Since it is competitive, salaries also would be responsive because there
would be no reason for a firm to bid more than necessary for services. See also Fama,
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980); Shavell,
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the typical CEO,65 but more importantly, documented his
contribution to shareholders and society. 66 Few would quar-
rel with compensation exceeding one million dollars for Lee
Iacocca.61  However, the decisions of boards of directors,
who are now sanctioning ratios of CEO salaries to workers'
median wages of 50 to 1 and even up to 150 to 1 (while in
Japan comparable ratios are closer to 15 to 1), raises serious
questions.68 It has been suggested by prominent business
school professors that their new graduates are putting their
own interests ahead of the firms which hire them.69 Board
members struggle with difficult realities each time they deal
with policies, personalities and performance in deciding
Risk Sharing and Incentives in the PrincipalandAgent Relationship, 10 BELL J. ECON.
55 (1979); Vagts, supra note 39.
65. The study found the typical CEO is 60 years old; earned his top position at
age 55; averages between 55 and 64 hours a week on the job; takes three weeks vaca-
tion a year, and has attended graduate school. Burch, A Group Profile on the Fortune
500 Chief Executive, FORTUNE, May 1976, at 172.
66. The typical Fortune 500 company corporate executive directs a company
whose sales in 1975 averaged almost $1.75 billion, whose assets totaled $1.33 billion
and which provided employment for almost 29,000 people. The average return on its
total investment was 11.6%. Id.
67. CEO of the Year Awards, FIN. WORLD, Mar. 31, 1983, at 17, described his
achievement as follows:
Five years later, against incredibly long odds, Iacocca has done just that -
he's saved Chrysler. In one of the most stirring performances in business his-
tory, he has returned the company to full year profitability in the midst of a
deep recession and erased all doubts about its survival. Certainly there are no
doubts about his performance among the judges for Financial World's CEO of
the Year awards. Recognizing his stupendous achievement, they have named
Chairman Lee A. Iacocca of Chrysler as this year's gold award winner.
But see Patton, supra note 57, at 26:
The top executives of a large number of the 100 largest companies, how-
ever, are administrators, not entrepreneurs. They head organizations that were
already in being when they reached the top. They are selling products or serv-
ices developed by others and usually remain in the top job for a very short
time. Yet directors frequently pay them as though they were entrepreneurs.
68. S. VANCE, supra note 43, at 80.
69. Friedman & Solman, Is American Management Too Selfsh?, FORBES, Jan. 17,
1983, at 75. "What we fail to instill in our students," says Robert Glauber [Professor
of Finance at Harvard], "is that they're agents of the system, not principals. That they
are being hired. But they don't look at it that way. For many of them, it's the mana-
gerial class against the world, willing to steal from the rich and poor alike." The
article concludes, "[a]ll the professors agree that we've got a problem: American
managers are too selfish and unaccountable." Id. at 77.
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what executives should be paid and whether golden
parachutes should be part of the arrangement.70
B. Defensive Tactic
Some proponents of golden parachutes also argue that
they are a defense against takeovers. However, the SEC Ad-
visory Committee concluded that "[i]n general, the Commit-
tee does not believe the arrangements for change of control
compensation in fact deter takeovers, as they are a small
fraction of an acquisition price."' 71 The Committee may be
correct in a takeover involving a large firm, but in an acqui-
sition of a smaller company, the transaction cost may be
much more significant.72 A recent federal district court case,
411en v. Wuf Resources & Chemical Corp.,7 3 involved a law-
suit brought by dissident stockholders who won control of
the company in a proxy dispute. The shareholders refused
to pay a thirteen million dollar parachute package. The firm
reported a $77.9 million loss for 1981.74
70. Patton, supra note 57, believes there are inherent problems with compensa-
tion committees:
Compensation committee members are usually chosen by the CEO. Needless
to say, such appointees are on friendly terms with the CEO. Not infrequently,
each is on the other's board of directors.
In judging management performance, these committee members share one
or more disadvantages:
-They have little day-to-day knowledge of individual performance.
-Most come from a different industry; therefore their understanding of
the economic pressure points that can determine the company's profit or loss is
usually limited.
-The professional or banking firms in which many directors are partners
frequently serve the company, creating at least a potential conflict of interest.
Retired executives like to be reelected each year to company boards, for
the rewards are not insignificant. Directors with a reputation for constantly
challenging the chief executive are less apt to be asked to return.
Id. at 24-26.
71. SEC Advisory Report, supra note 11, at 39-40.
72. See supra note 38 for a discussion of golden parachutes as a transaction cost.
73. No. 82-27756 (D. Ct. Harris County, Tex.) (compromise settlement agree-
ment in favor of Gulf Resources & Chemical Corporation was reached on January
19, 1984).
74. Author of Gui/s Success Written Out of the Part, N.Y. Times, June 10, 1982,
§ D, at 2, col. 5.
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C Objective Decision Making
Undoubtedly one of the most controversial "benefits" of
parachutes is that they will result in managers making more
objective decisions. Management literature," executive
speeches 76 and court decisions"7 have uniformly agreed that
the shareholder interests should be paramount in corporate
decision making. However, commentators have alluded to
the potential differences in duties owed to arbitragers who,
due to leveraging, may have an extremely short-term view of
the future.78 Numerous critics of parachutes correctly argue
that executives are already being compensated to make ob-
jective decisions in the interest of the corporation and there-
fore, any additional payment lacks consideration and is a
waste of corporate assets.79  This argument has been ad-
vanced in a number of recent court challenges to
parachutes. 80 It also seems unlikely that an executive would
"jump ship" at a time of crisis. Since his future employment
is heavily dependent on past performance, any indication of
a lack of loyalty or unwillingness to act with the best inter-
75. See S. VANCE, supra note 43, at 264-65. Corporations have stakeholders who
consist of shareholders, executives and other employees, customers, suppliers and the
general public. "But the most significant corporate constituency is the body of share-
owners." Id.
76. For example, William Agee is quoted as saying, "[y]ou've got to begin with
the basic tenet that the job of management is to maximize shareholder value." Koten,
BillAgee of Bendix Corp.: Why I DidIt, Wall St. J., Oct. 4, 1982, at 32, col. 2. He also
wrote his own explanation of the episode and made the following observation:
But our original initiative and the final result were totally consistent with
both the history of corporate growth and with the foremost objective of re-
sponsible management: improving the value of the shareholder's investment
over the long term. . . . Corporate leaders should not confuse the sharehold-
ers' best interest with their own. Scorching the earth, and tiers of tender offers,
may help corporate leaders preserve their jobs, but they do not benefit share-
holders as a whole, or the economy.
Agee, supra note 7, at A3 1.
77. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 298-99 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Treadway Co. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 381 (2d Cir.
1980).
78. See, e.g., Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101,
104 (1979). But see Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of Target's Management
in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1161, 1183-85, 1183 n.60 (1981).
79. Cooper, supra note 17, at 68 ("giving people a bonus to do what they should
do anyway."); Morrison, supra note 17, at 83; Nossiter, supra note 52, at 15.
80. See generally Golden Rip-Offs, supra note 35, at 47-48 (discussing recent
shareholder suits).
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ests of stockholders in mind would seriously affect his future
career.
Proponents argue that golden parachutes reduce distrac-
tion8' and promote an environment in which the executive is
able to make decisions without bias since his financial secur-
ity will not be affected.8 2 But it should also be noted that
factors other than monetary compensation may influence an
executive's action at this stage. These factors include the de-
sire to protect the job for the status that it brings,83 and, be-
cause a takeover is seen as an indication of below average
executive performance,8 4 the unwillingness to allow one to
occur.
D. Lack of Consensus as to Benefits
As stated above, closely related to the benefit of objective
decision making is the argument that golden parachutes
strengthen a company's resistance to a takeover. However,
stated in this form, the argument is clearly fallacious because
each offer is unique and requires an objective determination
by management and the board.85 Numerous commentators
81. See, e.g., Phillps Petroleum to Give Top 6 Officers 3 Years' Pay If Takeover
Ends Their Jobs, Wall St. J., Mar. 31, 1982, at 8. The distraction argument is pre-
mised on the fact that during a takeover fight the executive is under extreme pressure.
If the decision is made to resist the offer, specialists advise a rapid, firm response on a
number of fronts. The argument continues that due to time demands any distraction
has negative effects and should be eliminated if possible.
82. Unfortunately even "indifference" has its problems because an executive who
feels totally protected may lack the motivation to properly analyze the transaction
since his self interest is removed. For instance, many CEO compensation plans are
structured with options and bonuses under which the price of the firm's stock directly
influences the executive's wealth, thus creating a "win-win" maximization for the ex-
ecutive and shareholders. See, e.g., Executives Keep Reducing the Risks of a High-
Reward Career, Bus. WK., May 9, 1983, at 83.
83. Petitpas, supra note 64, at 13; Koten, supra note 76, at 32 ("A former Bendix
director was quoted in this newspaper as saying . . . 'It's a struggle between a few
very ambitious men using public companies for their own gain.' "). See also Mc-
Laughlin, The Myth of the Golden Parachute, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, Summer
1982, at 47, 48.
84. The ego factor should not be underestimated. Critics have cited this as being
very evident in the Bendix affair. See Morrison, supra note 17, at 86.
85. In reality it requires two decisions: the correct valuation of the firm and then
an analysis of the value of the offer. The creativity of offer provisions and the com-
plexity of valuation are often cited as reasons requiring the board's expertise. It also
could be harmful competitively for the corporation to divulge too much information
to shareholders, yet without information such as the probability of a new patent's
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have recently written on the duties of target management re-
sponding to takeover attempts, and many of them have con-
cluded that there is a fundamental dichotomy between the
interests of management and shareholders. 6 Much of the
disagreement is undoubtedly caused by a lack of consensus
as to whether the takeover process itself is beneficial or so-
cially desirable.87 Those who favor takeovers seem to be in
the majority and they argue that acquisitions are a method
of disciplining the market by punishing inefficiency and pro-
moting a proper allocation of resources.88 Commentators
and courts opposed to mergers point out that often the deci-
sions are made under time pressure without adequate infor-
mation.8 9 They argue that the vast sums which are paid to
attorneys and the extreme profits generated by arbitragers
may be at the expense of traditional shareholders and other
success or market share data the decision is being made without proper input. How-
ever, with respect to the decision to sell a firm, the adage, "everything has a price,"
seems to be valid.
86. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 78; Gelfond & Sebastin, Reevalu-
ating the Duties of Target Management in the Hostile Tender Offer, 60 B.U. L. REV.
403 (1980); Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations. The Case Against Defen-
sive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1981); Johnson, Anti-Takeover
Actions and Defenses: Business Judgment or Breach of Duty?, 28 VILL. L. REV. 51
(1982); Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers." A Proposalfor Legisla-
tion, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 249 (1983); Contra Block & Miller, The Responsibilities and
Obligations of Corporate Directors in Takeover Contests, I1 SEc. REG. L.J. 44 (1983);
Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom: An Update After One Year, 36 Bus.
LAW. 1017 (1981); Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAw. 101
(1979); Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom: A Response to Professors
Easterbrook and Fischel, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231 (1980).
87. See, e.g., Kiechel, Don't Stop the Mating Game, FORTUNE, Aug. 24, 1981, at
70; Louis, The Bottom Line on Ten Big Mergers, FORTUNE, May 3, 1982, at 84;
Lubatkin, Mergers and the Performance of the Acquiring Firm, 8 ACAD. MGMT. REV.
218 (1983);After Recent Merger Wave, Analysts are Debating Pluses, N.Y. Times, May
31, 1982, § D, at 1, col. 7. Perhaps the most significant harm of the takeover paranoia
is the adverse effect on long-term planning. The expenditure of executive time on
tactics designed to monitor or eventually defeat takeovers is harmful, but more criti-
cal are the potential business decisions. The possibility that management would
spend liquid reserves earlier than planned so as to be less attractive is certainly a
short-term strategy. Drucker, supra note 10, at 20.
88. See SEC Advisory Report, supra note 11, at 7-14.
89. The willingness of an acquiring firm to bid is arguably evidence of its belief
that the stock is undervalued relative to its assets or future earnings potential. Many
criticize the recent takeover phase as an attempt to surprise management and share-
holders of the target and force a decision before a proper valuation can be made.
Forcing the decision on an accelerated time basis does not allow time for a search for
potential white knights either.
[Vol. 67:293
GOLDEN PARA CHUTES
stakeholders of the acquired firm.90
IV. JUDICIAL DECISIONS
Rule 14e-2 91 is important when considering the duty of
target management to a tender offer. The rule requires man-
agement to take a position regarding any tender offer within
ten days of commencement of the offer. A statement ex-
plaining management's reason for the position must be dis-
closed. 92 Management may have an affirmative duty93 to
oppose a tender offer which, in its judgment, is contrary to
the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders.
The decisions of management have been supported by
courts under the business judgment rule. It has been articu-
lated in many different ways, but is grounded in the belief
that businessmen are most competent to make business deci-
sions and therefore the courts should not interfere. The Sev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals decision of Panter v. Marshall
Field & Co. 94 contains a representative statement of the Rule
90. See supra notes 75 & 78. See also Abegglen, Can Japanese Companies Be
Acquired?, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, Winter 1983, at 16, 18. ("[U]itimately the
Japanese company exists for the employees, to ensure their well-being and their fu-
ture. Thus, sale of the company is not a decision for the shareholders but is rather a
decision for the entire workforce of the company."). Vagts, supra note 39, at 241
stated, "concentration upon improving the earnings performance of a firm during a
given year may not be in harmony with the interests of the shareholders in maximiz-
ing the value of their securities, a value that depends upon the stream of earnings
expected to be derived over a number of years." See also Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472
F.2d 1081 (10th Cir. 1972).
91. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2 (1983). Securities and Exchange Commission Rule
14e-2 requires the target to announce its position with respect to the tender offer. See
generally Johnson, Disclosure in Tender Offer Transactions: The Dice are Still
Loaded, 42 U. PrT. L. REv. 1 (1980).
92. See B. Fox & E. Fox, supra note 54, at § 27.06[2] for a discussion of the
disclosure schedules.
93. See, e.g., Northwest Indus. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706 (N.D. Ill.
1969). The court recognized that officers and directors would frequently be accused
of trying to preserve their jobs at the expense of the corporation, but held "manage-
ment has the responsibility to oppose offers which, in its best judgment, are detrimen-
tal to the company or its stockholders." Id. at 712.
94. 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981). The court stated:
Directors of corporations discharge their fiduciary duties when in good faith
they exercise business judgment in making decisions regarding the.corpora-
tion. When they act in good faith, they enjoy a presumption of sound business
judgment, reposed in them as directors, which courts will not disturb if any
rational business purpose can be attributed to their decisions. In the absence
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and is also important for the warning expressed by a dissent-
ing judge, who stated that serious consequences can flow
from a total abdication by courts in these decisions. Courts
have allowed to stand actions of directors and management
which evidence the desire to remain in control, unless there
exists a "sufficient showing that the primary motive of the
board of directors was to retain control." 96
A number of courts, however, have been willing to limit
the use of the business judgment rule in takeover situations.
In Donovan v. Bierwirth97 the Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit affirmed a preliminary injunction, agreeing that
directors of the Gruman Corporation, who were also trustees
of the employee's pension plan, violated their fiduciary du-
ties under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA)98 by using pension plan assets to purchase
Gruman stock on the open market during a takeover at-
tempt. It is possible that a court would apply the same duty
to directors confronted with a contractual golden parachute.
of fraud, bad faith, gross overreaching, or abuse of discretion, courts will not
interfere with the exercise of business judgment by corporate directors.
Id. at 293 (quoting the trial court, Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 486 F. Supp. 1168,
1194 (N.D. I11. 1980)) (citations omitted).
95. 646 F.2d at 299 (Cudahy, J., dissenting) ("I emphatically disagree that the
business judgment rule should clothe directors, battling blindly to fend off a threat to
their control with an almost irrebuttable presumption of sound business judgment
96. Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 293 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
999 (1981) (emphasis added). See also Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933
(N.D. III. 1982) in which the court stated: "Whittaker has not made a sufficient show-
ing that the primary motive of the board of directors was to retain control." Id. at
951. But see Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Abrams, 510 F. Supp. 860 (S.D.N.Y.
1981). There the court found sufficient evidence to issue a temporary restraining or-
der to prevent directors from taking actions, including a "scorched earth" policy that
would undermine shareholder autonomy in tender offer disputes.
The events pose a possible case of a determination to keep control of the com-
pany entrenched within the present board of directors regardless of the com-
pany's real best interests or else to dismember it piece by piece, even to the
point of liquidation of the enterprise, regardless of the proclaimed profitability
and in the absence of all evidence whatsoever that the actual owners of the
enterprise want its demise.
Id. at 862.
97. 680 F.2d 263, 271 (2d Cir. 1982).
98. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). See generally Grinstead, The
Treatment of Employee Beneft Plans in Acquisitions, THIRTEENTH ANN. INST. ON SEC.
REO. 95 (1982).
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However, ERISA has placed extraordinary requirements on
trustees in order to safeguard workers' pensions.
The judicial policies of standing and mootness have re-
sulted in a number of courts refusing to consider the merits
of golden parachutes. In Lewis v. Anderson99 the Delaware
Chancery Court dismissed a lawsuit because the plaintiff
lacked standing after completion of the merger. In Mills v.
Esmark 1o mootness was the cause for dismissal. The Second
Circuit recently declined to adopt a broad interpretation of
the Williams Act.' 0' The court reversed the district court
and held that the gravamen of the claim was a breach of
management's fiduciary duty to shareholders which is a mat-
ter traditionally committed to state law.'0 2 The court also
held that employment guarantees had been adequately dis-
closed through reference to the earlier merger agreement
and thus Rule 14e-2 was not violated.10 3
V. SEC ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON TENDER OFFERS
At this point it is unclear what effect the SEC Advisory
Committee on Tender Offers' ° report will have on the SEC,
Congress or the courts. The composition of the Committee
was severely criticized and even after the addition of two
members it was still dominated by merger and acquisition
professionals.10 5 Many consider the recommendations to be
99. 453 A.2d 474 (Del. Ch. 1982) (dissident Conoco shareholder challenged the
validity of a $ 10 million golden parachute agreement given to nine executives prior to
the DuPont takeover, the court reasoned that since DuPont knew of the contracts
before the takeover, they assumed the employment agreements).
100. 544 F. Supp. 1275 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (court found no waste of corporate assets).
101. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78g, 79&-78n, 78s (1976). The Williams Act regulates the con-
ditions under which a tender offer can be made. A major effect of the Act is to create
sufficient delay to give the target's management the time to formulate a defensive
strategy. Ideally shareholders will then have sufficient information to make an in-
formed decision regarding the sale of their stock. See B. Fox & E. Fox, supra note
54, at § 27.04[3] for a discussion of the requirements of the Williams Act.
102. Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1983).
103. Id.
104. SEC Advisory Report, supra note 11.
105. See, e.g., Gilpin, Takeover Reform A Tender Topic, N.Y. Times, Apr. 18,
1983, at 22, col. 3; Icahn,.4 Statement to .4merican Management: Stop the Oppression
of Shareholders, N.Y. Times, May 22, 1983, § 3, at 2, col. 2 ("tantamount to the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency appointing a panel of captains and owners of the
Japanese fishing fleet to study the preservation of the whale."); Editorials, Takeovers
and the Public Interest, Bus. WK., June 13, 1983, at 152.
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merely fine tuning and the Committee has been criticized for
not adequately discouraging takeover proposals. 106
Most significantly the Committee recommended reten-
tion of the business judgment rule as the standard for testing
the actions of management. 10 7 However, the Committee has
proposed that an annual nonbinding shareholder vote be
conducted as to whether defensive tactics such as
"supermajority"' 08 charter provisions and golden parachutes
should be employed. The effectiveness of this proposal as a
protection for the majority of investors is questionable.
While institutional investors have shown a willingness to
vote against management on issues involving defensive tac-
tics,10 9 it is likely that the majority of shareholders would
follow management's recommendations on golden
parachutes and approve defensive proposals by wide mar-
gins. Evidence of this is found in the consistent shareholder
support of other proxy issues." 0
The Committee also recommended that the granting of
golden parachutes be prohibited during merger battles."'
Apparently, it was felt that there was an increased likelihood
of abuse, since decisions would be made without proper con-
sideration and the appearance of self-dealing is more acute.
This recommendation may be hard to enforce since it would
be difficult to define at what point a tender offer is imminent.
It is also hard to understand how the agreements "present
106. Brownstein, Merger Wars-Congress, SEC Take Aim At Hostile Corporate
Takeover Moves, NAT'L J., July 23, 1983, at 1538, 1539-40; Changing the Rules on
Tenders: A Report That Treads Softly, Bus. WK., June 13, 1983, at 33 ("In this partic-
ular chicken coop, the foxes seem rather numerous: the committee is filled with in-
vestment bankers and lawyers who specialize in launching or defending against
unfriendly takeovers."); Editorial, Taking Over Takeovers, ECONOMIST, July 9, 1983,
at 13.
107. SEC Advisory Report, supra note 11, at 34.
108. A supermajority provision is a bylaw term that erects a high barrier to
change in control by requiring a large level of approval from the shareholders.
109. See Why Anti-Takeover Barriers May Not Work, CHEMICAL WK., Aug. 3,
1983, at 35, 39; Okamoto, Stockholders Go On the Attack, Bus. WK., June 13, 1983, at
32; Lewin, Business and the Law: Proxy Fights Proliferating, N.Y. Times, Apr. 19,
1983, at 30, col. 1; Blustein, Measures to Discourage Takeovers Stir Controversy at
Annual Meetings, Wall St. J., Apr. 18, 1983, at 29, col. 3.
110. See, e.g., Loomis, supra note 60, at 46 ("It is hard to imagine uprising by
stockholders, who are seldom driven to vote down management proposals of any kind
.... S1),I111. SEC Advisor, Report, supra note 11, at 40.
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the appearance of self-dealing" during a takeover situation,
and yet not six months earlier. Basically, the recommenda-
tion appears to be an attempt to appease the critics of the
practice by prohibiting it.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
The decision of whether to allow golden parachutes is
not easy. It is a policy decision that entails many factors
and, at present, it is particularly difficult to formulate regula-
tions since so few parachutes have been exercised. A major
problem is that parachutes influence an executive psycholog-
ically, which makes it almost impossible to predict how each
executive will react. If, as William Agee claimed, he would
not have done anything differently without the golden para-
chute protection," 2 the issue of what benefit they actually
provide to the corporation is more acute. While it is under-
standable that courts do not wish to make these types of de-
cisions, the business judgment rule should not be used to bar
all inquiries into the decisions of a corporation. The serious
reservations expressed by many prominent executives and
business publications should compel a court to ascertain
whether the contracts have been entered into after proper
consideration of all the implications. 13 If the courts con-
tinue to allow shareholder challenges to board action
through the use of derivative suits114 and proxy challenges,"15
112. Morrison, supra note 17, at 84.
113. See Cooper, supra note 17, at 68; Editorials, supra note 50, in which the
author stated that parachutes are an "outrageous misuse of stockholders' assets and
an abuse of management prerogatives. They encourage the public's distrust of busi-
ness. And they stiffen worker resistance to wage and benefit concessions that many
companies need to stay in business." d. at 136. See also Golden Rip-Offs, supra note
35, at 46-48.
114. See generally 2 R. MAGNUSON, SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION § 15 (1981);
Block & Prussin, The Business Judgment Rule and Shareholder Derivative Actions."
Viva Zapata?, 37 Bus. LAW. 27 (1981); Dent, The Power ofDirectors to Terminate
Shareholder Litigation: The Death of the Derivative Suit?, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 96
(1980); Schwartz, Shareholder Democracy: A Reality or Chimera, CALIF. MGMT.
Rav., Spring 1983, at 53, 64.
115. Lewin, supra note 109, at 30. After explaining the increasing willingness to
challenge management's decisions, the author discussed a recent proxy contest: "One
sidelight to the Louisiana Land battle is the dissident slate's promise that, if elected, it
will not grant any further 'golden parachutes,' or termination agreements, to execu-
tives without shareholder ratification." Id.
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the board of directors should continue to make the decision
involving golden parachutes. Adequate disclosure of the
agreements is a necessity if these checks are going to effec-
tively operate. Boards have entered a new era in corporate
governance in the past decade and should be allowed to
make this decision."16 However, a nonreviewable decision
will most likely not be as thorough as a reviewable one.
Thus, the courts must allow shareholders to effectively ques-
tion those decisions and be willing to assist in a review of
them when allegations are made that the board has failed to
adequately protect the interests of shareholders.
Boards should have the freedom to offer executives pro-
tection in the event of a change in control, but golden
parachutes should not become standard in executive con-
tracts. Executive compensation should not be revised in re-
sponse to a takeover threat and remuneration should not
increase or extend for a period in excess of two years in the
event of dismissal. Full disclosure of the provisions, as well
as other components of executive compensation, is necessary
so that the media and financial analysts can inform unso-
phisticated investors of the levels and implications of the
contracts. If the current publicity, derivative suits and proxy
challenges do not result in adequate board scrutiny of these
contracts, the SEC should consider specific restrictions on
these contracts. At the present time, however, the harm of
golden parachutes has not been adequately quantified to jus-
tify governmental regulation as a replacement to the deci-
sion of an elected board of directors.
PETER L. COFFEY
116. Despite criticism of boards of directors, there seems to have been significant
changes in corporate governance within the last decade. Selection of members is now
broader, more time is spent on board decisions and the threat of lawsuits have all
resulted in more activist boards. See generally Ellig, Compensating the Board of Direc-
tars, COMPENSATION REV., 3rd Quarter 1983, at 15-17.
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